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Ideologies of Discrimination: Personhood
and the ‘Genetic Group’
Janet L. Dolgin*
‘Ideologies of Discrimination’ considers the implications of the new genetics for
understandings of personhood and for understandings of the relationship between
people in groups. In particular, the essay delineates and examines the emerging notion
of a ‘genetic group’ and considers the social implications of redefining families, racial
groups and ethnic groups through express, and often exclusive, reference to a shared
genome. One consequence of such redefinition has been the justification and elaboration of stigmatizing images of and discrimination against such groups—especially
those, such as Jews and African-Americans, that have long been identified with specific somatic characteristics. A few worrisome trends begin to emerge in the response
of the American legal system to the notion of genetic groups. Among these is a shift
in the locus of privacy and identity from the autonomous individual to the genetic
group. This shift challenges (and threatens) long-standing Western values (including
equality and liberty) that depend upon the ideological centrality of autonomous individuality.  2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Discrimination; Family; Genetic Group; Genome; Jews; Law; Privacy.

1. Introduction
For at least two centuries, the public order in the United States has been premised
on the notion of the autonomous individual as the locus of value and the agent of
social action. For most of that period, the private order—the domain of home and
family—has been defined by a more complicated dynamic within which the notion
of the autonomous individual has competed with, and provided a model against
which to measure, an alternative vision of personhood and of relationships. For
most of American history, that alternative vision was valued in domestic contexts,
and the open incursion of the autonomous individual into the home was feared. In
fact, however, personhood within the home—the person as exemplar of a status
within a hierarchically structured whole—was long molded and defined in contrast
with, and thus with express reference to, the autonomous individual that defined
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the domain of the marketplace. Until the last decades of the twentieth century,
‘home’ was expected to contrast broadly with ‘work’. Then, beginning in the 1960s,
American society began widely to reconstruct traditional understandings of family
to accommodate autonomous individuality and choice.
More recently, another vision of personhood is being elaborated in the context
of the new genetics and its institutional correlate, the Human Genome Project.
More particularly, the notion of the ‘human genome’, the proliferation and communication of genetic information, and the increasing availability of tests indicating
genetic alterations associated with illness encourage a novel vision of personhood
and of relationships among people in groups.
In theory, this new vision and the postulates about personhood on which it rests,
have assumed importance in only a few, clearly delimited contexts. In fact, however, these contexts begin inevitably to merge with others. As a result, postulates
about personhood being constructed around the new genetics have far-reaching
implications.
This essay concentrates on shifts in social understandings of groups emerging
in contexts defined through reference to genetic information. First, the essay considers the development of both genetic discrimination and stigmatization in the
U.S. and the law’s fledgling responses. Then the essay describes the notion of a
‘genetic’ family, as it is being developed by judges, lawyers, geneticists and others
concerned with the implications of genetic information. Next, the analogous notion
of a ‘genetic ethnic’ or ‘genetic racial’ group1 is described. The potential for genetic
information to create or elaborate prejudicial images of people is considered concretely through the example of Ashkenazi Jews.2 Jews, long identified in the West
through reference to somatic characteristics, have submitted often and willingly to
genetic screening and research programs in the last few decades. As a result, they
are now associated with a disproportionate number of genetic alterations known
to predispose people to serious illnesses. Finally, the essay considers various social
implications of re-defining families as well as ethnicity and race through reference
to mapped genomes, and suggests that long-standing Western values are directly
challenged by a view that submerges the autonomous individual to the primacy of
the genetic group.3 Those values, virtually all forged during the early years of the
Enlightenment, molded by the Industrial Revolution, and reflected clearly in the
1
As used in this essay the terms ‘ethnic’ and ‘race’ or ‘racial’ refer to social, not biological, constructs.
Within the American context, groups defined as ‘ethnic’ differ from those defined as ‘racial’ on the
basis of the consistency and force with which those identified with the group are excluded from enjoying
social and economic resources (Dolgin, 1977, p. 145). In the U.S., African-Americans have been treated
in racial terms more often, and more harshly, than other groups. Unless otherwise indicated, this essay
employs the term ‘ethnic’ to refer both to ‘ethnic groups’ and ‘racial groups’.
2
The term ‘Ashkenazi’ refers to Jews who settled in Europe and Russia. About 82% of the world’s
Jewish population is of Ashkenazi origin (Markel, 1997, p. 50). Unless otherwise indicated, this essay
uses the term ‘Jew’ to refer to Jews of Ashkenazi origin.
3
See infra, notes 51–52 and accompanying text (noting Louis Dumont’s description of a similar
process in another context).
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Bill of Rights and in later amendments to and interpretations of the U.S. Constitution, depend on the notion of the individual person as worthwhile and distinct.
2. Genetic Discrimination and Stigmatization
Lawrence Gostin defines ‘genetic discrimination’ as ‘the denial of rights, privileges or opportunities on the basis of information obtained from genetically-based
diagnostic and prognostic tests’.4 The term ‘genetic stigmatization’, as used in this
essay, refers to the creation of prejudicial, generally dehumanizing images of, or
speech about, an individual or a group through reference to genetic information.
In practice, genetic discrimination and genetic stigmatization merge.
Genetic discrimination can affect individuals as such or individuals as members
of groups. Employers have refused to hire, and insurers to cover, individuals who
test positive for harmful genetic alterations as well as individuals identified, through
familial or ethnic associations, with groups linked with particular genetic alterations. One study, carried out almost a decade ago, reported numerous instances
of discrimination, especially in insurance and employment contexts, against individuals who tested positive for genetic alterations associated with illness. Some of
those who suffered discrimination were carriers, at no risk of becoming ill with
the condition in question.5 A more recent survey of people at risk of developing
a genetic illness identified 200 cases of genetic discrimination among 917 respondents.6 A 1998 U.S. government report concluded that ‘[g]enetic predisposition or
conditions can lead to workplace discrimination, even in cases where workers are
healthy and unlikely to develop disease or where the genetic condition has no effect
on the ability to perform work’.7 Other reports indicate genetic discrimination in
an even wider variety of contexts. Genetic information can influence institutional
and legal decisions about parental rights, criminal sentencing and parole status.8
Some cases of genetic discrimination have developed from screening or research
projects that focused on members of particular ethnic groups. In the 1970s, over
a decade before the initiation of the Human Genome Project, the U.S. Congress
passed a law that financed and encouraged states to screen African-Americans for
the sickle-cell trait.9 Although African-American groups had originally lobbied in
favor of the legislation, they were dismayed by the consequences, which included
about a dozen states, mostly in the south, making receipt of marriage licenses and
4

Gostin (1991), p. 110.
Billings et al. (1992), p. 478.
National Human Genome Research Institute (1998).
7
The report was produced jointly by the Department of Labor, Department of Health and Human
Services, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Department of Justice (National Human
Genome Research Institute, 1998).
8
Stolberg (1994), p. A1.
9
National Sickle Cell Anemia Control Act, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 300(b)(1) et seq. The Act was passed
in 1972, as an amendment to the Public Health Service Act (Public Law 92-294). It was amended in
part and repealed in part in 1981, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 95 Stat. 827 (1981).
5
6
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admission to primary school dependent on sickle-cell screening. Moreover, in the
1970s, the Air Force Academy barred African-Americans who tested positive for
the sickle-cell trait from participating in pilot training programs because of a belief,
ultimately proven erroneous, that they were likely to become ill at high altitudes.10
The case suggests the coalescence, in practice, of genetic discrimination and
genetic stigmatization. The association between African-Americans and sickle-cell
anemia was used to reinforce existing racism and to justify discriminatory policies.
In the end, the African-American community felt betrayed by the management
of state-sponsored screening projects for the sickle-cell trait and by unsupported
suggestions by scientists that carriers were hyper-sensitive to a series of workplace
toxins.11 African-Americans have resisted participation in further genetic testing
and screening programs. The case suggests that statistical associations between
harmful genetic alterations and ethnic groups can lead to discrimination (sometimes
simply in the form of mandatory testing). Such discrimination may be fueled by
existing prejudices and may, in turn, rekindle old prejudices with new evidence of
group marginality.
As genetic testing becomes more common and less expensive, genetic discrimination and stigmatization will likely occur more frequently. The specter of genetic
discrimination suggests that participation in genetic screening and testing programs
can be economically and socially hazardous.12 Researchers and industry representatives are concerned that people will increasingly refuse to participate in genetic
research and screening. Indeed, Francis Collins, Director of the Human Genome
Research Institute, has encouraged legislators to assist genetic research by calming
popular fears about potentially invasive and discriminatory uses of genetic information.13 U.S. lawmakers have begun to respond to concerns about the invasion
of genetic privacy and about discriminatory uses of genetic information. The results
are inconsistent and inadequate. There is only one federal statute that responds
directly to concerns about the use of genetic information. That law, the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 199614 prohibits insurance companies from relying on genetic information to establish eligibility for health insurance
coverage. However, the statute does not define ‘genetic information’, and thus
leaves open the possibility that insurers can refuse coverage on the basis of information obtained through medical histories. Moreover, the statute does not prohibit
insurance companies from raising rates or excluding coverage completely for parti10

Kaufman (1999), n. 72.
Rhodes (2000), p. 118; Pugh and Ridder (1998).
In contrast, some social commentators suggest that genetic discrimination is ‘rational’ and will
therefore not stimulate or exacerbate racial or ethnic discrimination. Andrew Sullivan, writing in a
recent issue of the New York Times Magazine, explained that ‘[t]he point of laws against racial bias
is to outlaw irrational discrimination based on irrelevant characteristics. The point of laws against genetic
discrimination is to outlaw rational bias based on relevant information’ (Sullivan, 2000, p. 16).
13
Mansoura and Collins (1998) p. 344, citing Collins (1997).
14
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1995)
(codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
11
12
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cular conditions. And the statute does not, and was not intended to, protect against
genetic discrimination outside the context of health insurance.
The majority of states have laws aimed at prohibiting genetic discrimination or
at safeguarding genetic privacy, but many of these statutes provide only limited
protection and suffer from limited applicability. A few state statutes protect only
against genetic discrimination involving specific illnesses.15 Others provide broader
protection, but even the most comprehensive of the state laws16 are inapplicable
to self-funded health plans.17
Virtually all the laws that have been promulgated to channel the uses of genetic
information either protect genetic privacy or limit genetic discrimination, but do not
expressly preclude the use of genetic information to develop stigmatizing images of
groups. That task is generally beyond the scope of the American legal system.
Indeed, American constitutional law, unlike that of many other nations, largely
precludes laws prohibiting group libel on the ground that such laws would violate
the right to free speech. Professor David Richards, in support of this rule, comments
that ‘[p]rotecting the rights of the speakers and speech we hate affirms the deeper
fraternal bonds of a political community based on universal human rights’.18 Ironically, however, those bonds and the rights on which they are presumably based
could themselves be threatened by the ideological construction of genetic groups,
especially if that construction undermines the notion of the autonomous individual
as the locus of social value.
The notion of genetic groups—especially of the ‘genetic family’—takes form in
U.S. courts of law, asked to resolve disputes about genetic information, in the
official statement of at least one American professional association concerned with
the ethics of professionals’ disclosing or refusing to disclose genetic information
about clients, and, even more self-consciously, in the commentaries of legal theorists.
3. Genetic Families
The notion of a genetic family eclipses both the notion of the autonomous individual that anchors the construct of the modern family-by-choice and the notion
of the hierarchically structured community that anchors the construct of the traditional family.

15
See, for example, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. Sec. 22:652.1 (West 1995); Tenn. Code Ann. Sec. 56-7-207
(Supp. 1997).
16
See, for example, New Jersey Genetic Privacy Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. 17B:30-12 (West 1996).
17
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), federal law preempts state
law with regard to such plans. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
18
Richards (1999), p. 821.
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3.1. Constructing the Genetic Family
The parameters and ramifications of the ‘genetic family’ are suggested by two
legal cases, both decided in the 1990s. In the first of these cases, Pate v. Threlkel,19
the Florida Supreme Court found an exception to the general rule that a professional
can only be sued for malpractice by someone in a relation of legal privity with
that professional. The court granted Heidi Pate standing to sue Dr. James Threlkel.
Dr. Threlkel had treated Heidi Pate’s mother, Marianne New, for medullary thyroid
carcinoma. Pate argued, and the court agreed, that Threlkel was obligated to warn
New of the implications for New’s children of her hereditary condition. The
court explained:
[W]hen the prevailing standard of care creates a duty that is obviously for the benefit
of certain identified third parties and the physician knows of the existence of those
third parties, then the physician’s duty runs to those third parties. Therefore, . . . we
hold that privity does not bar Heidi Pate’s pursuit of a medical malpractice action
. . . [U]nder the duty alleged in this case, a patient’s children fall within the zone of
foreseeable risk.20

Thus, the court allowed Pate to proceed with her case. But it refused to impose
a duty on the doctor to provide genetic information about his patient directly to
the patient’s child or to other similarly situated third parties. The doctor’s duty to
warn about the hereditary implications of New’s condition extended only to New,
herself. ‘To require the physician’, explained the court, ‘to seek out and warn
various members of the patient’s family would often be difficult or impractical and
would place too heavy a burden upon the physician’.21
Yet, in 1996, a New Jersey appellate court concluded that a physician might be
required to do just that. The facts that occasioned Safer v. Pack resemble the facts
of Pate.22 In 1990, Donna Safer, then thirty-six years old, was diagnosed with a
hereditary form of colon cancer.23 Twenty-six years earlier, when Donna was ten,
her father, Robert Batkin, died of the same condition. In 1992 Donna commenced
suit against Dr. George Pack,24 who had treated Donna’s father from the time that
Batkin was diagnosed with colon cancer in 1956 until his death in early 1964.
Donna argued, first, that she had standing to sue Pack, despite never having been
his patient, and, second, that Dr. Pack’s duty to warn extended beyond Pack’s
19

661 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1995).
661 So.2d at 282.
21
661 So.2d at 282.
22
Safer v. Pack, 677 A.2d 1188 (N.J. Super. 1996). The trial court had dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint.
The appellate court reversed the order dismissing the complaint, and thus sent the case back for a trial
on the merits.
23
The pathology report, done after Robert Batkin’s first operation for colon cancer in 1956, concluded
that he had adenocarcinoma ‘with diffuse intestinal polyposis’. Dr. Pack noted this finding in his discharge summary. Polyposis is a hereditary condition which leads to colon cancer (Amended Complaint,
Safer v. Pack, 667 A.2d 1188, at 4, 7; filed Dec. 10, 1992). I am grateful to Gary Maher, attorney for
plaintiffs Donna and Robert Safer for sending this complaint to the Hofstra Law Library.
24
Actually, Donna sued George Pack’s estate, since Pack had died in 1969 (677 A.2d at 1190).
Donna’s husband, Robert Safer, joined Donna in initiating the suit.
20
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patient, Robert Batkin, to Batkin’s daughter, Donna Safer, at least through Ida
Batkin, Safer’s mother and Robert Batkin’s wife. Ida Batkin testified that neither
her husband nor Dr. Pack had ever informed her about the hereditary implications
of her husband’s illness. Rather, she testified that Dr. Pack variously informed her
that her husband suffered from a ‘blockage’ or an ‘infection’. Ida Batkin further
testified that when she inquired as to whether the illness could affect her children,
she was told ‘not to worry’.25
The New Jersey appellate court accepted both of Donna’s arguments. By 1996,
a number of courts in New Jersey and elsewhere had concluded that the right to
sue in duty-to-warn cases was not premised on the plaintiff’s having been in a
relation of privity with the defendant. Not only had the Florida Supreme Court
decided Pate v. Threlkel a year earlier, but in the previous two decades a growing
number of state courts had found exceptions to the traditional rule that limited
plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases to people who had themselves been patients
of the defendant.26
Donna’s second argument—that Dr. Pack was obliged to warn not only his
patient but his patient’s child (presumably by informing that child’s mother, perhaps after Robert Batkin’s death) about the hereditary implications of Batkin’s
illness—was more controversial. A 1981 New Jersey malpractice case that involved
a hereditary disorder provided some support. In Schroeder v. Perkel,27 the New
Jersey Supreme Court imposed a duty to warn that resembled the duty that Donna
Safer asked the state appellate court to impose. Schroeder was initiated by Marion
and John Schroeder, who argued successfully that the pediatricians of their young
daughter, Ann, were negligent in failing to warn them that Ann suffered from a
hereditary condition (cystic fibrosis) that could affect a subsequent child. The
Schoeders, unaware of the nature of Ann’s illness, had had a second child who,
like his older sister, suffered from cystic fibrosis. The pediatricians who had treated
Ann Schroeder argued that they owed no duty to their patient’s parents that
extended beyond their duty to the patient herself. The court disagreed:
A physician’s duty thus may extend beyond the interests of a patient to members of
the immediate family of the patient who may be adversely affected by a breach of
that duty. Here, the physicians had not only a duty to Ann, but an independent duty
to Mr. and Mrs. Schroeder to disclose to them that Ann suffered from cystic fibrosis
. . . The defendants should have foreseen that parents of childbearing years, such as
Mr. and Mrs. Schroeder, would, in the absence of knowledge that Ann suffered from
cystic fibrosis, conceive another child.28
25

677 A.2d at 1190.
The first such case, decided in California in 1976, imposed a duty on a psychotherapist to warn a
patient’s intended murder victim of the risk. (Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 551
P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). In 1993, the highest court in Tennessee required a doctor to warn a patient’s
wife that she was at risk for becoming ill with rocky mountain spotted fever from which her husband
was suffering. The ‘duty to warn’ cases are reviewed in Deftos (1999), pp. 111–29.
27
433 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1981).
28
432 A.2d 834, 839-40.
26
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Although the decision imposed a duty on physicians to warn family members of
the hereditary character of a patient’s illness, the court’s holding reflects commonsensical understandings of a pediatric practice which routinely involves physicians’
discussing a patient’s health with parents of the patient. Certainly, Schroeder raised
no issues about Ann Schroeder’s right to medical confidentiality. In contrast, Donna
Safer asked that a physician be legally obligated to disclose information about his
patient’s condition with that patient’s child.
The Safer court cited Schroeder approvingly, but did not discuss the broad differences between the two cases. The court simply noted:
Although an overly broad and general application of the physician’s duty to warn
might lead to confusion, conflict or unfairness in many types of circumstances, we
are confident that the duty to warn of avertible risk from genetic causes, by definition
a matter of familial concern, is sufficiently narrow to serve the interests of justice.29

Judge Kestin, who wrote the opinion for the court, delimited a number of issues
that would presumably have to be resolved at trial.30 Among them was the effect
of a directive (if such existed) from Robert Batkin that Dr. Pate not discuss the
hereditary implications of his condition with family members. In general, the court
did not foreclose the possible imposition of a duty on a physician to warn family
members about the genetic implications of a patient’s illness, even in contravention
of the patient’s preference. The court suggested that the law might impose a duty
to reveal in such circumstances ‘after the patient’s death where a risk of harm
survives the patient’.31
Safer suggests a far-reaching reconstruction of the locus of family privacy. A
similar position has been suggested by the American Society of Human Genetics
(ASHG), which proposed granting health care workers the ‘discretionary right’ to
contravene rules that normally protect patient confidentiality in a set of cases
involving ‘familial’ conditions.32 The ASHG Statement asserts that ‘genetic information is both individual and familial’. Thus, ‘depending on the circumstances’,
the Statement concludes, ‘the health-care professional may have a privilege to warn
at-risk relatives’.33
29

677 A.2d at 1192.
The case was tried before a jury in late 1999. At trial, Donna Safer lost. No written decision was
handed down by the trial court, but Gary Maher, one of the plaintiffs’ attorneys explained that the
decision apparently rested in large measure on the conclusion that Donna Safer or her mother, did, in
fact, know about the hereditary implications of Robert Batkin’s illness (information from Gary Maher
to Connie Lenz, Assistant Director, Maurice A. Deane Law Library, Hofstra University School of Law,
described in e-mail, dated 10/6/99, in file of author). The appellate court decision had noted this possibility. ‘We note’, the court wrote, ‘the possible existence of some offsetting evidence that Donna was
rectally examined as a young child, suggesting that the risk to her had been disclosed’. 677 A.2d at 1193.
31
677 A.2d at 1193.
32
American Society of Human Genetics Social Issues Subcommittee on Familial Disclosure (1998).
33
ASHG Statement, at p. 482. More fully, the Statement’s conclusion reads:
30

At the very least, it is clear that a health-care professional has a positive duty to inform a patient about potential
genetic risks to the patient’s relatives. Then, depending on the circumstances, the health-care professional may
have a privilege to warn at-risk relatives if the harm is serious, imminent, and likely; if prevention or treatment
is available; and if the health-care professional, if she or he were in similar circumstances, would disclose.
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More strongly still, a number of recent commentaries in law reviews have concluded that, in cases involving genetic illnesses, ‘the patient’ includes not only the
ill individual but others in the patient’s family who could be at risk of developing
the same condition. So, for instance, Robert Wachbroit expressly redefines ‘patient’
in such circumstances:
Allowing for the possibility that the patient may be more than just an individual does
not amount to jettisoning the duty of medical confidentiality . . . The idea of privacy
can be applied to more than just individuals. For example, a health professional’s
duty might be to respect the privacy of a family, rather than that of an individual.
Indeed, by expanding the concept of ‘patient,’ it is possible to retain much of the
structure of the standard approach to confidentiality.34

Similarly, a 1999 law review Comment defines the genetic family to subsume
the identity of individual family members and therein dismisses concern that a
health worker’s disclosing genetic information to a patient’s family members would
inappropriately interfere with the patient’s right to privacy.
Confidentiality [in genetic contexts] is not in danger because, even assuming that
policies in favor of confidentiality outweigh a duty to warn, a duty of confidentiality
is not violated in the situation involving the warning of genetic diseases. The Safer
court mentioned that, by their very nature, genetic diseases are a familial concern . . .
[I]t would seem that if a doctor warns a patient’s at-risk relatives (which is really
the ‘multitude of family’) of a patient’s genetic disorder, the patient’s interest in
keeping the information confidential is not sacrificed. This new analysis of the duty
of confidentiality demonstrates that, arguably, such a duty does not pose a barrier to
the duty to warn of genetic defects.35

Thus, the Comment suggests that established rules of confidentiality, and presumably rules that protect privacy more generally, are inapplicable to a universe in
which the autonomous individual is effectively replaced by the larger, unstructured
genetic group. That position reflects the assumptions that informed the Safer court
when it delineated a duty to disclose genetic information to a patient’s genetic
family. In the implicit view of the Safer court, to require Dr. Pack to tell Donna
Safer about her father’s illness was, in effect, only to require Dr. Pack to tell
Donna Safer about herself. That view of familial identity does not harmonize with
understandings of personhood and of relationships within either traditional families
or modern families.
3.2. ‘Traditional’ Families, ‘Modern’ Families and the Genetic Family
The implications of the genetic family become clear in express comparison to
both ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ understandings of family. Despite marked differences between notions of traditional families and modern families, both notions
depend on a set of essential assumptions about the centrality of the autonomous
34
35

Wachbroit (1999), pp. 1395–6.
Burnett (1999), pp. 577-8 (emphasis added).
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individual in contemporary life. For traditionalists, the family is, and should be,
defined in express contrast to the autonomous individual, who populates the marketplace. For those favoring ‘modern’ families, the person-at-home resembles the person-at-work in being the arbiter and agent of social action. Indeed, for almost two
centuries—and more self-consciously and volubly within the last half century—a
public debate about family within the U.S. has questioned the rigidity of tradition
in the name of choice, and the flexibility of choice in the name of tradition. The
debate, as Professor Marilyn Strathern insightfully suggests, has resulted in an
apparent paradox. Society is characterised by ‘both more tradition and more modernity at the same time’.36
From the early years of the American Republic until the second half of the
twentieth century, definitions of personhood and of relationships within families
were forged in clear, almost self-conscious contrast with the world of the marketplace, created by the Industrial Revolution. Within family contexts, American
society valued the status-oriented, hierarchically organized familial whole rather
than the autonomous individual, per se. In consequence, relationships within families, unlike relationships within most social and economic domains, were not
expected to be egalitarian. Largely determined by age and gender, family roles
were defined in terms of status, and familial relationships were understood ideally
as sentimental and enduring.37
This so-called ‘traditional’ family, though distinct from the world of the marketplace in most regards, was a product, and thus an ideological correlate, of that
world. The differences between ‘home’ and ‘work’ served among other things to
justify the division of labor and differences in opportunity that kept women at
home, caring for hearth and kin, while their children, beginning in the early decades
of the nineteenth century, attended school and their husbands left home each day
to labor in the market.
The ‘family-by-choice’38 that emerged clearly in the last decades of the twentieth
century—and that was developing less publicly for over a century and a half—
contrasted sharply with the traditional family in that it posited choice, rather than
inexorable biological truth, to be the central determinant of domestic relationships.
Despite that difference and others, the ‘family-by-choice’ and the traditional family
represent aspects of one ideological frame that has defined and delimited the scope
and parameters of family life for most of American history.
The emergence of the construct of the genetic family challenges the presumptions undergirding tradition and modernity alike. The unit of social value assumed
by the Safer court was neither the traditional, holistic family nor the autonomous
36

Strathern (1996), p. 45.
David M. Schneider described the forms that defined the American family in the middle decades
of the twentieth century, just before the ‘traditional’ family was challenged by alternative understandings
of family (Schneider, 1968).
38
Kath Weston relies on the notion of choice to describe a variant of ‘modern’ families (Weston,
1991).
37
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individual whose familial identity is understood as essentially a matter a choice.
Rather, the court understood the unit of social value, defined through reference to
mapped DNA, as the undifferentiated genetic family that included father and
daughter, alike. That unit is indifferent to notions of hierarchy, holism and loyalty
that define relationships within traditional families and to notions of personal privacy, equality and choice that define relationships within the modern family-bychoice.
4. Genetic Ethnic Groups
Throughout American history, ethnic groups, like families, have been described
through metaphors of natural substance. Yet, as the geneticization of families transforms the scope of relationships and identity within domestic settings, the geneticization of ethnic groups—especially through the association of such groups with
harmful genetic alterations—transforms the parameters of ethnic identity. Moreover, the geneticization of ethnic identity produces new data that can be used to
justify the social marginalization of ethnic groups defined through reference to
genetic information.
The proliferation of genetic information and the association of harmful genetic
alterations with groups traditionally defined through reference to somatic traits pose
a series of interconnected concerns that overlap with, while differing from, concerns about the implications of genetic families. First, the process of geneticization
can justify discrimination, thereby limiting access to various social and economic
resources for those identified with genetic ethnic groups. Second, geneticization
can encourage the elaboration of stigmatizing group images. Third, and more
broadly, the generalization of an ideology that assesses people through reference
to a ‘human genome’ can undermine established social mechanisms most suited
to limit genetic discrimination.
The case of Ashkenazi Jews is illuminating. This group—understood variously
as a religion, a race, a nation, an ethnic group—has experienced widespread discrimination and stigmatization throughout Western history. In recent years, Jews
have been recruited for, and have willingly participated in, genetic screening and
research programs. In consequence, a disproportionate number of harmful genetic
alterations are now associated with Ashkenazi Jews. Among these are alterations
that predispose people to Tay-Sachs disease, breast cancer, ovarian cancer, Bloom
Syndrome and colon cancer.39 Publicity surrounding these findings has resulted in
a widespread, though mistaken, belief that Jews are more prone to genetic disorders
than others. Even doctors and scientists echo the belief. At least one sperm bank
in Boston has cautioned potential donees to avoid ‘Jewish sperm’, claiming that
39
Levin (1999), p. 208 (noting predisposition to Tay-Sachs); Rothenberg (1997), p. 98 (noting predisposition to breast cancer and ovarian cancer); Roa et al. (1999), p. 219 (noting predisposition to Bloom
Syndrome); Nelson (1998), p. 884 (noting predisposition to colon cancer).
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they are more likely than the sperm of other men to transmit genetic diseases
to offspring.40
Jews first volunteered to participate in mass genetic screening programs in the
1970s as part of an effort to identify carriers for Tay-Sachs, a neurological disorder
inherited recessively that affects children in the first year of life.41 At least one
journalist has asserted that blood samples taken from people who participated in
the early Tay-Sachs screening programs have remained on file at medical facilities
and have been used for research to which the subjects never consented.42 Further,
this research is reported to have led to some of the early findings linking Jews
with harmful genetic alterations.
Such data is open to a wide variety of social interpretations some of which
suggest disconcerting historic parallels. Eeta Prince-Gibson refers to a number of
journalistic responses:
Ashkenazi Jews are a relatively homogeneous group . . . who volunteer for testing
and who tend to live in the large urban centers with medical research institutions . . .
[and] are among the first groups in which ethnic-specific cancer-causing alterations
have been found.
But these factors were not reflected in the newspaper headlines. Newsday ran a
series on ‘Mutant-Gene Carriers’. A midwest regional paper proclaimed ‘Ashkenazi
Jewish women stalked by second mutant breast-cancer gene.’ And a Jewish newspaper in the New York region published a series of articles on ‘tainted Jewish
genes’.43

Such responses recall a long history in the West in which images of the Jew,
developed by non-Jews, and sometimes internalized by Jews, defined the Jew as
physically marginal and flawed. ‘The marked body of the Jew’, explains Laurie
Zoloth-Dorfman, ‘has long been a source of reference against which to measure
the normal human body, read generally as the body of the Christian male.’44 Such
images punctuate Western history. In feudal times, they were presented in the
language of theological piety. Later, in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Germany,
Jewish marginality was signaled in the language of science and medicine. Sander
Gilman describes one example concerned with the presumed deformity of Jewish
feet.45 The weakness of the Jewish foot, associated with flatness or with the Jew’s
peculiar gait, was understood to disqualify the Jew from serving as a foot soldier,
and thus from participating fully in national life. In a chapter entitled, ‘The Jewish
foot’, Gilman writes:

40
This information was provided by a potential client of the sperm bank in question (Interview with
Anonymous, May 2000, in files of author).
41
An assay for the Tay-Sachs enzyme (Hexosaminidase A) was developed in 1971 (Edelson, 1997,
p. 127).
42
Prince-Gibson (1998).
43
Prince-Gibson (1998).
44
Zoloth-Dorfman (1998), pp. 181–2.
45
Gilman (1991) pp. 38–59.
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The idea that the Jew’s foot is unique has analogies with the hidden sign of difference
attributed to the cloven-footed devil of the middle ages . . . [T]he association between
the sign of the devil and the sign of disease was well established in the early modern
era . . . By the nineteenth century the relationship between the image of the Jew and
that of the hidden devil is to be found not in a religious but in a secularized scientific
context. It still revolves in part around the particular nature of the Jew’s foot—no
longer the foot of the devil but now the pathognomonic foot of the ‘bad’ citizen of
the new national state. The political significance of the Jew’s foot within the world
of nineteenth-century European medicine is thus closely related to the idea of the
‘foot’-soldier, of the popular militia, which was the hallmark of all of the liberal
movements of the mid-century.46

Contemporary assertions that Jews are genetically distinct, or more provocatively
that they carry ‘mutant’ genes, are reminiscent of Gilman’s portrait of nineteenthand twentieth-century claims about the abnormality of the Jewish foot. A mode of
discourse grounded in the notion of mapped genomes could easily be appropriated
to serve racist ends.
Neither Western history generally nor American history, more specifically,
clearly discount the possibility that a mapped ‘human genome’ could become the
map of the ‘normal’, against which groups presumed marginal will routinely be
measured and defined. In the U.S., as elsewhere, law and political sentiment struggle—though not without opposition—to preclude or limit that construction.
Ironically, however, the political mechanisms and social assumptions on which
efforts to protect against genetic discrimination are grounded are themselves challenged by the emerging ideology of genetic inheritance.47 That ideology trivializes
theories of personal and social responsibility, facilitates depersonalization through
the association of genetic groups with mapped genomes, and, in the extreme, threatens to eviscerate the notion of the autonomous individual to which contemporary
constitutional rights are anchored.
5. Social Implications of the Genetic Group
The effort to contain genetic discrimination in the U.S. depends on a set of social
beliefs and legal rules that have supported virtually all American efforts to contain
or preclude discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion and national origin.
At base, U.S. law and policy have long been committed, in theory if not always
in practice, to safeguarding the social and political rights of the autonomous individual. Similarly, efforts to protect genetic privacy (or the privacy of medical records more generally) are anchored to the notion of the autonomous individual as
the subject of the ‘right to privacy’.
The rights to equality, liberty, free speech, privacy and choice are all premised
46

Gilman (1991), pp. 39–40.
Professor Kaja Finkler has insightfully considered and analyzed the development of the ideology
of genetic inheritance in contexts of genetic diseases and of adoption (Finkler, 2000).
47
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on the notion of the autonomous individual as the uniquely valuable locus of social
action. That notion of personhood was largely presumed in 1791 when the Constitution was amended through addition of the Bill of Rights;48 in 1865 when the
Constitution was amended to prohibit slavery,49 and in 1868 when it was amended
to protect the ‘person’ from state intrusions on ‘life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law’ and to safeguard for all persons ‘equal protection of the laws’.50
The notion of a genetic group that undergirds Safer, and that is suggested, analogously, by the identification of ethnic groups with mapped genomes that differ
from the ‘normal genome’, displaces the autonomous individual with an unspecified
(and often unspecifiable) number of people—fungible, each with the others and
with the larger genetic group that they compose. In short, within genetic families
and genetic ethnic groups, the unit of ultimate importance is variously the genetic
whole or any of its presumptively identical parts. The French Indologist Louis
Dumont, writing about a different context, defined the social, political factors that
facilitate the evisceration of autonomous individuality in a universe that presumes
to prize individuality. Dumont suggested that ‘totalitarianism results from the
attempt, in a society where individualism is deeply rooted and predominant, to
subordinate it to the primacy of the society as a whole’.51 Fascism understands
the whole (the nation) through the metaphor of the individual. The totalitarian
phenomenon, Dumont explained, ‘is internal to the modern world’.52
Genetic families and genetic ethnic groups are defined exclusively with reference
to mapped DNA. Within such groups, the autonomous individual, understood with
reference to Enlightenment values, vanishes and is replaced by the genetic group
and its undifferentiated units. Social and personal responsibility are displaced.
Choice—as well as the illusion of choice—is eviscerated. The essential a-morality
of a universe defined through reference to mapped genomes augurs poorly for the
preservation of a set of rights and safeguards that developed within an ideological
frame constructed around the autonomous individual as the essential unit of social
action and value. Thus, efforts to preclude or limit genetic discrimination are hampered doubly by the development of an ideology of genetic inheritance—by the
essential a-morality of a universe that understands people through reference to
DNA and by the construction of genetic groups that presume the ‘subordination’
of the individual to the primacy of the group.
A social universe defined through reference to genetic information is indifferent
to the scope and form—indeed, even to the fact—of social relationships among its
members. In practice, therefore, social relationships are likely to be variable and
unstable. Relationships will vary insofar as those identified with genetic groups
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U.S. Constitution, Amendments I–X.
U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIII.
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U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV.
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Dumont (1977), p. 12 (emphasis in original).
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continue to invoke alternative understandings of families (or ethnic groups) as
social institutions. Kaja Finkler shows insightfully how this occurs in her study of
family members’ responses to genetic information. Such relationships will be
unstable insofar as the a-morality of the genetic group attenuates the apparent value
of alternative understandings of social relationships. The central focus on ‘nature’
(presumed by the ideology of genetic inheritance) blurs the traditional significance
of culture’s interacting with nature, in delimiting personhood and in channeling
behavior.
The practical consequences of an ideology of genetic inheritance for ‘genetic
families’ will likely differ from the practical consequences for ‘genetic ethnic
groups’. The geneticization of family dislocates understandings of familial
responsibility and, at the same time, precludes escaping from the familial group.
Responsibility and choice are equally victims of the geneticization of family
relationships. In addition, the process of geneticization threatens a system of social
presumptions and legal rules that have protected family privacy and the privacy
of the individual within familial settings. The geneticization of ethnicity presents
different risks. Ethnic groups have been especially vulnerable to social stigmatization and discrimination. Thus members of genetic ethnic groups—those defined
through ethnicity and through reference to specific genetic alterations—are susceptible to the abuse of genetic data to reinforce historical prejudices and to justify
new ones. The risk is especially serious for members of groups that have been
defined prejudicially through reference to somatic traits. Genetic information is far
more powerful as a tool for creating and justifying prejudice than presumed correlations between physiognomic traits and other characteristics.
6. Conclusion
The proliferation of genetic information challenges existing conceptions of personhood, and thus of relationships. American law-makers, especially legislators,
have begun to erect a body of rules aimed at protecting genetic privacy and safeguarding against genetic discrimination. Those rules presume a democratic system
within which the autonomous individual is the agent of action and the locus of
social value. Yet, the construction of genetic groups challenges that presumption,
as does the generalization of an ideology of genetic inheritance beyond medical
contexts—into the workplace, schools, prisons and families. Should the ideology
of genetic inheritance become the central frame within which people view themselves and other people, individuality will be displaced by and submerged within
the (genetic) whole. That shift will directly challenge social presumptions that
facilitate legal and political efforts to counteract the worst abuses of the ‘genome’.
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